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A study on the prepayment behavior of Hong Kong mortgage loans is 
conducted. With all of the loans as adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), we 
find that 1) Prepayment speeds up and then slows down as the mortgage 
seasons; 2) Prepayment speeds up as the rate markup decreases; 3) 
Prepayment speeds up as the interest rate increases; 4) Prepayment 
speeds up when the profitability ratio of the banks ( the prime-HIBOR 
spread) is higher; 5) Prepayment speeds up as the price of the property 
market falls; 6) Prepayment speed is faster for loans with a lower 
loan-to-value ratio; 7) Prepayment exhibits a seasonal pattern: people tend 
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1.  Introduction 
 
With a rising property market over the past many years, a major portion of 
commercial banks' assets in Hong Kong is now composed of residential 
mortgage loans.  Any strong movement in the property market or interest 
rates could prove damaging, and this poses a great risk to the commercial 
banks and to the health of the financial system as a whole.  A more active 
secondary market on mortgage loans, and even a government sponsored 
mortgage corporation, are now emerging to answer the need of institutional Mortgage Prepayment Behavior  65 
   
investors to diversify their risk.  To facilitate trading in this  market, it is 
essential, given Hong Kong's unique risk environment and geographic 
identity, to understand the characteristics of the mortgage loans. 
 
Borrowers have the right to pay off all or just a part of the mortgage balance 
at any time subject to penalties. This uncertainty leads to a prepayment risk 
for the lenders. A study of the prepayment behavior and the corresponding 
risk thus becomes a prerequisite for a sound risk management practice for any 
investor holding portfolios of mortgage loans. While there has been research 
into the prepayment behavior on the U.S. market, an investor, who is 
interested in investing in the secondary market of mortgage loans in Hong 
Kong, would want  to know the prepayment pattern in Hong Kong. The 
research efforts focused on the Hong Kong mortgage loan market would be 
of special value given that there are some unique geographic and economic 
elements in Hong Kong. 
 
While most of the previous mortgage prepayment studies have dealt with 
fixed-rate mortgage loans or had to incorporate the dimension caused by 
prepayment due to the switch from ARMs to fixed-rate mortgages, the 
scarcity of fixed rate mortgage loans in Hong Kong makes the current study 
more focused. Given that most mortgage loans in Hong Kong are plain vanilla 
type ARMs, mortgagors in Hong Kong do not have to consider the effects of 
interest rate caps/floors/teasor when they choose the mortgage. The 
prepayment behavior of ARMs in Hong Kong is thus probably more uniform 
since there are fewer  factors affecting prepayment. 
 
Mortgages can be thought of as a simple coupon bond plus a prepayment 
option.
1 The option can be exercised involuntarily or due to strong economic 
reasons. In this study, we try to capture some of the factors affecting 
mortgage prepayment behavior quantitatively. Among them, seasoning 
effect, financial reasons due to the sharpening of the rate markup, movements 
of the prime-HIBOR spread and the local property market, the individual loan 
characteristics and the summer effect. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  In section 2, we 
introduce our econometrics model.  A proportional hazard model, which 
nicely separates the seasoning part from the effects of other economics 
factors, is used in our study.  In section 3, we present the data the estimation 
results.  A brief discussion of the empirical results is also included.  Section 4 
concludes. 
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2.  Econometric Model 
 
The major components of residential mortgage loan prepayment are housing 
turnover, loan refinancing, partial prepayment and mortgage defaults. In turn, 
for an adjustable rate mortgage, non-economic reasons aside, the decision on 
when to exercise the prepayment option will be determined by factors relating 
to the above components as well as the ordinary factors as implicit in the 
seasoning effect and potential signaling effects similar to those suggested in 
Dunn and Spatt (1985). With partial prepayments being uncommon and 
defaults in residential mortgage loans rarely observed in Hong Kong, we will 
first try to locate the factors relating to the housing turnover and loan 
refinancing. 
 
Hong Kong had a rising and volatile housing market for decades. Speculation 
in the housing market is prevalent. This leads to a great deal of housing 
turnover. Also due to the uncertainties in the political scene and the settling 
down of these uncertainties, there is a substantial immigration and emigration 
occurring, which again causes some housing turnover. The normal reasons 
for housing turnover also exist here. People shuffle (upgrade/downgrade) 
their housing portfolio from time to time because of changes in their income 
status. All these critically depend on the movements of the housing market 
which, in turn, are driven by the housing price variations and the term 
structure variations of the interest rates. 
 
The adjustable-rate mortgage loans are charged as a markup on top of the 
prime rate.
2 The prepayment behavior in the case of ARMs would be less 
sensitive to the interest r ate movements than in the case of fixed-rate 
mortgage loans. While the prepayment behavior in the ARMs case could be 
fairly interest rate insensitive, it is affected by the markup changes in the 
Hong Kong mortgage loans. Due to the boom of the local property market as 
well as the fierce competition between local banks to give loans, the interest 
rate markup has been decreasing from 225 basis points to the current 50 basis 
points. This drastic change happened in a short period of less than three 
years (1994~1997) and could induce a large incentive for mortgagors to 
refinance their mortgage loans. Thus mortgage prepayment due to mortgage 
refinancing is another major source of prepayment in Hong Kong. 
While in-depth research would involve the modeling of the housing 
turnovers and refinancing of the loans at the micro-level, or the so-called 
                                                                 
2 In Hong Kong, the prime rate is the rate banks charge to their most creditworthy 
customers. 
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structural modeling approach, in this research, instead, we will do a reduced 
form study as in the study of Schwartz and Toros (1989) and the Prudential 
Securities prepayment model as in Huang and Xia (1996). In other words, we 
will use a statistics model to summarize the patterns of the observed 
prepayment and the factors associated in a data set of the Hong Kong 
mortgage loans. 
 
We will empirically model the prepayment function by the prepayment 
function. The prepayment function gives the probability of a mortgagor 
prepaying a mortgage during a particular period, conditional on the mortgage 
not having been prepaid prior to that period. By expressing this conditional 
probability as a function of various explanatory variables or covariates, we 
may assess statistically the significance of these covariates in influencing a 
mortgagor's prepayment decision. 
 
Let T be a continuous random variable representing the time until prepayment 
of a mortgage, and let t denote its realization. Let v = (v1, v2,…, v3) be a vector 
of explanatory variables or covariates upon which the time until prepayment 
may depend, while q = (q1, q2,…, q3) is a vector of parameters to be estimated. 
The prepayment function p(t;v, q) is defined by 
 
( ) q p , ;v t   =  
( )






            (1) 
 
where  S(t;v,q) represents the survivor function. The prepayment function 
p(t;v,q) specifies the instantaneous rate of prepayment at T = t, conditional 
upon the mortgage not having been prepaid prior to time t.   
 
We model the prepayment function by a proportional-hazards model: 
 
( ) q p , ;v t  =  ( ) ( ) n b r g p exp , ; 0 t           (2)  
 
where the base-line hazard function po(t;v,  q)  is given by the log-logistic 
hazard function 
 













             (3) 
 
The base-line hazard function measures the probability of prepayment under 
homogenous conditions,  v =   0. The log-logistic hazard function admits a 
variety of relationships between the probability of prepayment and the age of 68  He and Liu 
   
the mortgage. In particular, for p > 1, the probability of prepayment increases 
from zero to a maximum at 
 
t* =( ) g / 1
/ 1 p p -               (4) 
 
and decreases to zero thereafter. This kind of prepayment  behavior is 
consistent with the seasoning effects. On the one hand, people tend not to 
prepay too soon after paying hefty setup costs; on the other hand, as time 
goes by, most prepayments would already have been made and the 
prepayment would slow down. By modeling the base-line hazard function, 
as opposed to employing an arbitrary specification, we incorporate our prior 
knowledge of seasoning's influence on mortgage prepayments. 
 
The probability of prepayment does not depend solely upon the age of a 
mortgage.  Our prepayment function takes into account the fact that various 
explanatory variables, v, influence the prepayment decision. According to the 
proportional-hazards model, these explanatory variables have an 
equiproportional impact at all mortgage ages. The vector of regression 
coefficients, b(b1, b2,…, b3), measures the effect of the covariates upon the 
prepayment decision. 
 
To empirically implement our prepayment function requires that we specify 
explicitly the covariates influencing the mortgagor's prepayment decision. 
Given the lack of demographic information and the small size of Hong Kong, 
we will exclude the use of demographic or geographic explanatory variables in 
our analysis. 
 
A mortgagor's prepayment decision is dependent upon the change of the 
interest rate markup on which the monthly installment is determined. We 
calculate the ongoing rate according to the average rate of the newly 
originated loan, rft•rft would contain information regarding the markup change 
as well as the interest rate movement. To investigate the effect of markup 




1(t) = ct ft r r -               (5) 
 
where rct denotes the rate the homeowner is currently paying.  v1 will give us a 
measure as to how large the markup reduction is or how large the benefit is to 
refinance. If b1 < 0, the larger the markup reduction v1 is, the higher is the 
speed of prepayment. Note here, the rate rft gives the markup charge to an 
average customer and rct may contain a premium or discount according to the 
creditworthy of the particular customer. Mortgage Prepayment Behavior  69 
   
 
To allow for the possibility that prepayments may further accelerate when 
future rates are sufficiently lower than the current mortgage rate, we also 
consider the covariate: 
 
v2(t) =(rft - rct)
3              (6) 
 
The further acceleration in prepayments reflects transaction costs which make 
prepayment less profitable when interest cost savings are small. This 
covariate allows for the possibility that, for a sufficiently low rate difference, 
the resultant prepayment speed may be lower than the prepayment speed 
predicted by  v1 only. Here, we expect b2 > 0. 
 
A mortgagor's prepayment decision would depend on the level change of the 
interest rate term structure. When the prime rate increases, the cost of capital 
for the mortgagor also increases. The increase of cost of capital would then in 
turn reduce the incentive for the mortgagor to hold the mortgage and thus 
speed up prepayment. That is, if 
 
v
3(t) = Prime Rate t-1 - Prime Ratet-2       (7) 
 
we would expect  b3 > 0. Notice here we use the lag of interest rate level 
change to reflect the potential lag in the adjustment of the cost of capital of 
mortgage loans. 
 
Prepayment would also depend on the current prime-HIBOR spread or the 
profitability ratio of the local banks.  As the prime-HIBOR spread relates to 
the profit margin to the banks, the steepness of the prime-HIBOR spread 
would control the level of competition of the banks in giving loans.   
 
When the prime-HIBOR spread i s high, many banks will offer loans and 
mortgagors will refinance their existing mortgages with these mortgage loans 
with more attractive terms.  This greatly stimulates the refinancing activities.   
 
When the prime-HIBOR spread is low, smaller banks may not want to provide 
loans and therefore the prepayment process will be slowed down.  On the part 
of mortgagors, this would also indicate the willingness of theirs to disinvest 
as captured similarly in v3.  This implies a faster prepayment for the period 
when the prime-HIBOR spread is higher. We thus expect b4 > 0.  We use the 
difference between the prime rate and the one-month HIBOR rate for this 
covariate, 
v
4(t) = Prime Rate 1 - t  - HIBOR one month 1 - t        (8) 70  He and Liu 
   
 
While it can be rigid to change, the prime rate could be roughly thought of as 
the long-term interest rate. And the Hong Kong interbank offered rate 
(HIBOR) could be considered as the short-term interest rate. 
 
We also consider the effect of the rise in house prices on the prepayment 
rate. For speculators, a slight fall in house prices would signal a possible 
downturn of the housing market. This may trigger prepayments because the 
underlying property is more likely to be sold to reap the capital gain. We will 










quarter   previous   the   of   index Property 
quarter   this   of   index Propety 
log 100 (t) v5       (9) 
 
We therefore expect that b5 < 0. We use quarterly data for property prices 
here because we are not able to find data at monthly frequencies. 
 
The prepayment behavior of a homeowner with a higher cost of capital could 
be very different from that of an ordinary homeowner. Some mortgagors 
would have easy access to additional funds and some would have difficulties 
to access the capital. These two different types of mortgagors would display 
totally different behaviors in terms of selling their property and thus their 
prepayment behavior would also be different. We control for this effect by 
using the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio at the loan closing time. Presumably 
people borrowing with smaller LTV ratios tend to have easier access to 
capital, and so they will tend to prepay as soon as the economic situation 
becomes unfavorable. In the empirical study, instead of the LTV ratio, we use 
variable that we call the relative LTV ratio. The relative LTV ratio is generated 
by using the LTV ratio divided by a certain critical LTV ratio. This critical LTV 
ratio varies from time to time and is set by the corporation to safeguard 
against any unsafe lending.
3 For example, it was .90 in 1991 and .70 in 1994. 
 
v
6(t)= Relative LTV =  
LTV   critical   The
loan   th   of   LTV
        (10) 
 
If the above economic reasoning prevails, we should expect  b6< 0. 
 
On the other hand, speculators or noise traders are more concerned with the 
short-term capital gains rising from their housing portfolio. As they think they 
have superior information, they tend to utilize as much leverage as possible. 
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So a high LTV ratio may simply be indicative of speculative borrowings. 
These borrowers tend to resell the property and thus incur fast prepayments. 
If this economic reasoning dominates, we should expect  b6>0.  Finally, 
seasonality may influence prepayment activity. We represent this covariate 








April   -    September   t   if   0
         August   - May    t   if    1   
(t) v7         (11) 
 
More residential real estate transactions occur in the summer season if there 
is any relocation consideration. Hence, we should see b7> 0. 
 
3.  Estimation and Empirical Result 
 
3.1  Data Description and Maximum-Likelihood Estimation 
 
Given the assumed prepayment function and available mortgage data from 
corporation P,
4  we will estimate statistically the significance of seasoning as 
well as the posited covariates in influencing a mortgagor's prepayment 
decision. We employ the method of maximum likelihood. That is, we determine 
the prepayment function's parameter values that are most plausible in light of 
the observed prepayment activity. 
 
The data provided to us by Corporation P consists of 8865 loans, with a total 
value of around 12 billion Hong Kong Dollars. The data includes the 
origination date, the prepayment date, original property price, location of the 
property, characteristics of the mortgage and the monthly payment history. 
While more than  half of the loans originated after 1994, some of the loans 
started as early as 1981. So we have roughly a cross section of 16 years of 
mortgage loan data. All the loans we have are adjustable rate mortgages and 
should be still repaying if not prepaid. 
 
Of these 8865 loans, 262 of them have been partially prepaid. The 262 partially 
prepaid loans are important in that a proper usage of this information could 
help us to pin down the contribution of the partial prepayment to the 
prepayment behavior. The rest of the mortgages consist of 3089 prepaid loans 
and 5414 continuing loans. The age of the prepaid loans, when prepaid, has a 
mean of 2.6 years and a standard deviation of 2.1 years. Since there is no 
prepayment before March 1994, it seems that the data has been self-censored. 
We miss the prepayment information prior to March 1994. Because of the 
                                                                 
4 Due to a confidentiality agreement, we cannot reveal the name of the 
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censorship problem, we will conduct the estimation on both the full dataset 
and the dataset with all loans originated before March 1994 truncated, or the 
truncated dataset. For the truncated dataset, we have 1260 loans prepaid up 
to 1997 and 4124 continuing loans, for a total of 5384 loans. See Figure 1a-b 
for a picture on when the loans were initiated and when they were prepaid. 
 
The data are organized into four samples: the full sample with partial prepaid 
loans, the post-1994 sample with partial prepaid loans, the full sample without 
partial prepaid loans, and the post-1994 sample without partial prepaid loans. 
The four samples, as suggested by their names, could reveal the prepayment 
information from various perspectives. While the full dataset may provide us 
with more information, the partial dataset gives us more accuracy. Thus, when 
we interpret the estimation, we shall bear in mind that the truncated dataset is 
limited in the sense that the maximum age of the loan is only three years for 
the post-94 samples and that there is a censorship issue involved for the full 
samples. 
 
Table 1 and Table 2 presents the summary statistics of all the variables used 
in our empirical studies for both the prepaid loans and the continuing loans 
respectively. While v1,v2.v3 summarize the general economic conditions, the 
other factors are individual loan characteristics. As can be seen from the 
tables, the prepaid loans are older than the continuing loans on average. The 
following casual comments can be made based on the statistics of the table: 
the prepayment tends to happen at a time 1) when the rate markup changes 
more adversely, or 2) when prime increases, or 3) when term structure is 
steeper, or 4) when the property price rises mildly. All these remarks would be 
confirmed by our maximum likelihood estimation of the next subsection. 
 
To have a better idea of the general economic condition of the period we 
studying, Figure 2 a-b presents in picture the interest rate changes and 
property price change during the sample period. The difference between the 
line "Prime+Markup" and the line "Prime" in Figure 2a will give us some ideas 
about v1. As can be seen, the markup has been decreasing through the time. 
The movements of v3 and v4, as they can be derived from the time series prime 
rate and the HIBOR rate, are also shown in Figure 2a. The movement of the 
housing price index, v5, is shown in Figure 2b. 
 
Figure 1a: Number of Loans Originated in Each Month Mortgage Prepayment Behavior  73 
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Figure 2a: Movement of Interest Rates 74  He and Liu 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Factors Used: the Prepaid Loans Mortgage Prepayment Behavior  75 
   
Variable   Description    Mean   Standard Deviation 
Age  Age of the loan (year)        2.666    2.186 
v1  The markup change      - 0.708    2.459 
v2  The cubic of the markup change  -347.286   11889.3 
v3  Change of prime rate        0.021    0.103 
v4    Slope of term structure        3.112    0.167 
v5    Property price change        3.449    4.502 
v6  Relative Loan-to-Value ratio      0.654    0.391 
v7    Summer dummy          0.302    0.459 
Note: The summary statistics are generated based on the full sample with 
partial prepayment and is generated using the prepaid / partially 
prepaid loans only. The variables take the value at the time of 
prepayment or partial prepayment. 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Variables Used: the Continuing Loans 
Variable   Description    Mean   Standard Deviation 
Age  Age of the loan (year)       1.920        2.021 
v1  The markup change     - 0.045        0.954 
v2  The cubic of the markup change  -15.793    863.858 
v3  Change of prime rate              0               0  
v4  Slope of term structure       2.768               0 
v5  Property price change       8.758               0 
v6  Relative Loan-to-Value ratio     0.614        0.415 
v7  Summer dummy                0               0 
Note: The summary statistics are generated based on the full sample with 
partial prepayment and is generated using the continuing loans only. 
The variables take the value at the endpoint of the sample. The O 
standard deviations appear because the variables representing 
economic condition takes a single value. 
 
Denote the set of prepaid mortgages with I=1,2,…,I, and the set of surviving 
mortgages with j=1,2,…,J.  Then assuming the conditional independence of 
prepayment decisions across time and across mortgages (given the posited 
v(tk), where t k denotes the age of prepayment or the age of the surviving 
loans.), the resultant logarithmic likelihood function is given by 
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i h h t t t t
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) ) ( 1 ln( )) ( exp( )] ) ( 1 ln( )) ( exp( g n b g n b       (11) 
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The above likelihood function diverges with gﬁ 0 and p < 1. The model is 
thus not unidentifiable unless we are willing to restrict g. We did exactly this 
in our empirical study and a lower bound is set for g. We could also use some 
other hazard functions of other parametric families in our study. The reason 
why we chose to use this particular model is that this model captures the 
effects of seasoning in a very nice way. 
 
3.2  Empirical Result and Discussion 
 
We have done our numerical exercises with all four different data samples. 
The maximum likelihood estimation generates a series of estimates for the 
parameters in our proportional  hazard model as we illustrated in Table 3. 
Bootstrapping is conducted to generate the standard deviations for the 
estimates. They give us some idea of the significance of the estimates. We 
have similar estimates for all the different data samples. The estimated 
coefficients for all factors have the same sign across different samples. 
 
Table 3: The Estimates of the Model with Different Samples 
  F. S. w. P  F. S. w/o P.  P-94 S. w. P.  P-94 S. w/o P. 
  Est.   std. 
dev. 
Est.  std. 
dev. 
Est.  std. 
dev. 
Est.  std. 
dev. 
g  0.136  0.007  0.136  0.004  0.136  0.010  0.135      0.007 
 p  1.307  0.032  1.209    0.009  1.402  0.038  1.416      0.058 
b1  -0.012  0.002  -0.021   0.001  -0.014  0.001  -0.018     0.001 
b2(10
-6)  2.503  0.122  3.150  0.093  3.060  0.085  3.612      0.115 
b3  0.112  0.084  0.978  0.100  0.133  0.007  0.535      0.090 
b4  0.440  0.023  0.396  0.014  1.095  0.045  1.027      0.046 
b5   -0.104  0.004  0.093  0.004  -0.241  0.008  -0.221     0.008 
b6    -0.213  0.026  -0.274  0.015  -0.142  0.025  0.057      0.034 
b7    0.045  0.023  0.315  0.012  0.028  0.038  0.302      0.098 
Note: This table gives the maximum likelihood estimates and their standard 
deviations with four samples. In the table, F.S.w.P. stands for "Full 
Sample with Partial-Prepaid loans", F.S. w/o P. stands for "Full 
Sample without P artial-prepaid loans", P -94 S.w.P. stands for 
"Post-94 Sample with Partial-Prepaid loans", P-94 S. w/o P. stands 
for "Post-94 Sample without Partial-Prepaid loans". Here Post-94 
sample means the sample of data with all loans originated before 
1994 truncated. The standard deviations are generated by 
bootstrapping. 
 
Rate markup increases have a negative effect on the prepayment as expected. 
Namely, the lower the current markup, the more probable it is that a mortgagor 
tends to repay. The prime rate increase a lso has a negative effect on the Mortgage Prepayment Behavior  77 
   
prepayment. This is consistent with the hypothesis that prepayment is a 
response to the payment shock of rising mortgage payments. These results 
are consistent with Lea and Zorn (1986). The coefficient of the cubic term b2 is 
highly significant, which again demonstrates the importance of modeling the 
potential nonlinearity as suggested in Schwartz and Torus (1989). 
 
Judging from the coefficient of v4, the effect of a steeper prime-HIBOR spread 
would induce a higher prepayment speed.  This result, if we take the variable 
as a proxy for the slope of the term structure,  is inconsistent with Huang and 
Xia (1995). In their paper, they find a flatter term structure would increase 
prepayment speed. The underlying reason for our result, we think, may lie in 
the totally different structure of the Hong Kong mortgage loan market. 
Competition between the banks at the high Prime-HIBOR spread period may 
lead to a great deal of prepayments and thus a different sign of the 
coefficient. 
 
The property price increase would have a negative effect on the prepayment 
speed as can be seen from the estimates of  b5. At times of rapid price 
increase, prepayment would be significantly slowing down. This result is 
sensible given the potential short-term  continuation of property price as 
demonstrated in Case and Shiller (1990). A rise of property price tends to be 
followed by a further increase of property price and this would reduce the 
possibility of potential housing turnover. The result is consistent with the 
result in Lea and Zorn (1986). 
 
The effect of the loan-to-value ratio on the prepayment speed b6 is negative. 
This seems to suggest that the lower LTV ratio is indicative of an easy access 
to additional funds and the mortgagor would prepay as long as the economic 
condition becomes unfavorable. Also there seems to be a "summer effect" as 
suggested by most mortgage prepayment research. 
 
In figure 3 a-b, we plot the implied survival probability and hazard rate for 
these two sets of estimators with all the covariates fixed at the mean level. As 
we discussed in section 3, the post-94 sample gives us better information in 
the prepayment behavior for the first three years and the full dataset gives us 
better information in the prepayment behavior for those years after the third 
year. Some salient features of the pictures are: the hazard rate first goes up 
and peaks around the third year and goes down slowly for the following 
years. Partial prepayments only contribute a small portion to the total 
prepayments.  According to the picture given by the full sample, we could 
keep around 40% of the mortgages in five years and 20% of the mortgages in 
ten years. 
 78  He and Liu 
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Given the estimated prepayment function, the prepayment risk associated 
could be figured out by simulations. Since much research has been done on 
it, we will not go into that in the current study. Anybody who is interested in 
that kind of exercise, please refer to Huang and Xia (1996) or Kau, Keenan, 
Muller and Epperson (1990).  
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
As demonstrated by McConnell and Singh (1991), the value of ARM-backed 
securities with a proper modeling of prepayment could be significantly 
different from its value when the prepayment is absent. As the financial 
community of Hong Kong sets to securitize its huge assets of residential 
mortgages, a careful analysis of the prepayment behavior of the local 
mortgagors like ours is thus called for. Our study also contributes to the 
study of ARMs prepayment in general as there is rarely an environment with 
ARM of plain vanilla type as the dominant mode of mortgages. Our study is 
of value also in that the analysis in this paper has been made on the basis of 
micro-level data. 
 
Our empirical result suggests the following, 1) Prepayment speeds up and 
then slows down as the mortgage seasons; 2) Prepayment speeds up as the 
rate markup decreases; 3) Prepayment speeds up as the interest rate 
increases; 4) Prepayment speeds up when the profitability ratio (the prime- 
HIBOR spread) is higher; 5) Prepayment speeds up as the price of the 
property market falls;  6) Loans with lower loan-to-value ratios tend to be 
prepaid faster; 7) Prepayment exhibits a seasonal pattern: people tend to 
prepay in the summer. 
 
We thank Charles Huang for providing the data and his many suggestions. We also 
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